Partition of India and Bengal and Some Myths

Nalinaksha Bhattacharyya

15th August 1997 will be the 50th anniversary of Indian independence. It will also be the 50th anniversary of the partitioning of the country, uprooting of millions and massacre of thousands. The official history of India (as taught to us in our school da ys) outlined a simple story-one where Congress leaders were on the side of the angels and Jinnah and Muslim League were the culprits. Much later, on examining the issue closely, I found that the hands of the Congress leaders were also dirty in the matter of partition of the country. I would like to present the skeletons that were always there but were kept out of our history books. Before I start, however, I should point out that this narration should not be construed as a defence of Muslim League's role.

Jinnah and Muslim league were guilty and their main motivation was power. The point is that Congress leaders were also equally guilty and their motives were power too. It is time that we are aware of these issues.

Popular Myth #1 Muslims wanted Pakistan as a separate state for Muslims and they voted for it

The election in which Muslim League had their decisive victory was the election in 1946. This election was held under the Govt.of India Act 1935. Under this act,not everybody had the right to vote. That is it was not a system of adult franchise. Therefore if one is saying that the poll of 1946 was reflecting the public opinion on partition then one is exaggarating.

"The Muslim League adopted the Pakistan demand in its Lahore resolution in 1940. At that time the demand stated that the geographically contiguous regions of India where the muslims are a majority like the North West and the Eastern side of India, should be constituted as INDEPENDENT STATES where the constituent units would be independent and soverign." [Source:Banga-Vanga o Samprodayik Rajniti by Badruddin Umar, 1st Edition, 1987, Chirayat Prakashan, Calcutta pp 19-20-matter translated from Bengali by me]

The Pakistan movement in the then Bengal was organised on the basis of this resolution. Please note the word INDEPENDENT STATES. After the election victory in 1946, Muslim League organised a convention in Delhi. This was a convention of the newly elected Muslim League legislators. In that convention Jinnah moved the following resolution demanding a single state of Pakistan. His resolution read

"That Zones comprising Bengal and Assam in the North-East and Punjab, North-West Frontier Province, Sind and Baluchistan in the North-West of India, namely Pakistan Zone where the Muslims are in a dominant majority be constituted into a soverign Independe nt STATE and that an unequivocal undertaking be given to implement the establishment of Pakistan without delay." [Source:Badruddin Umar, ibid, pp20] Note the substitution of STATE (in the 1946 resolution)for STATES (in the 1940 resolution).

The General Secretary of the Bengal Provincial Muslim League, Abul Hashem objected to Jinnah's words. Sunil Das writes:

"The contradiction that had surfaced between the concepts of two Independent Soverign 'States' of Pakistan and that of one 'State' caused an alarm in the mind of at least one delegate in the subjects Committee Meeting of the Delhi Convention, who was no l ess a person than Abul Hashem, the then secretary of the Bengal Provincial Muslim League. Abul Hashem contended that the Delhi Convention Resolution would strip Bengal of her Independent and Soverign status which Lahore and Madras Resolutions sought to co nfer on her. Jinnah dismissed all misgivings about the two concepts inherent in the word 'State' and 'States' as mere typographical mistakes thereby wrapping up two prospective states of Pakistan, as contemplated in the Lahore Resolution of March 1940, in to one State, thus robbing Bengal in the not-so distant, framework of Pakistan her autonomy and soverignity. The Leaders of the Bengal Provincial Muslim League did not bargain for the suppression of autonomous and soverign rights of Bengal in the Pakistani set up to come. This suppression, therefore, might have prepared the ground later on inMarch 1947 to goad H .S Suhrawordy, Abul Hashem, Fazlur Rahman (Dacca), Mohammed ali (Bogra) and other luminaries of the Bengal Provincial Muslim League to join Sarat Chandra Bose's campaign for United soverign Bengal." [From Sarat Chandra Bose -Commemoration Volume as quoted in Badruddin Umar, ibid]

Therefore, even if we accept the argument that 1946 election had Pakistan as a question it is quite evident that the nature of this Pakistan (one State, Two States, relation with Rest of the Indian states) was not clearly spelt at that time and thus could not have been a choice before the electorate.

The demand of the League in its Lahore Resolution was for two independent STATES. The demand was modified by Jinnah AFTER the election victory in 1946. Therefore it cannot be said that the people had a chance to express their opinion.

Since there was no adult franchise therefore the opinion of the common people on the question of partition was never sought. Also it should be clear from the quotes that the political demand on which the election of 1946 was fought was different from partition. This should also be clear from the fact that many prominent muslim league leaders later supported the United and Independent Bengal proposal of Sarat Bose.

Popular Myth # 2 Congress did everything possible to avert partition

Let us first see how Jawaharlal sabotaged Cabinet mission. Let me quote from Maulana Azad:

" The Muslim League Council had accepted the Cabinet Mission Plan. So had the Congress Working Committee. It however needed the approval of the AICC. .... A meeting of the AICC was called at Bombay on 7 July, 1946.....When the AICC met I invited Jawaharlal to take over as Congress President from me. Then I moved the resolution on the Cabinet Mission Plan and briefly spoke about its main features....I ...pointed out that the Cabinet Mission Plan had accepted in all essentials the Congress point of view. It guaranteed the unity of India while at the same time it held out the necessary assurances to the minorities...... My speech had a decisive influence on the audience. When the vote was taken, the resolution was passed with an overwhelming majority. Thus the seal of approval was put on the Working Committee's resolution accepting the Cabinet Mission Plan. .....

Now happened one of those unfortunate events which change the course of history. On 10 July, Jawaharlal held a press conference in Bombay in which he made an astonishing statement. Some press representatives asked him whether, with the passing of the Reso lution by the AICC, the Congress had accepted the plan in toto, including the composition of the Interim Government. Jawaharlal in reply stated that the Congress would enter the Constituent Assembly 'completely unfettered by agreements and free to meet all situations as they arise'. Press representatives further asked if this meant that the Cabinet Mission Plan could be modified.

Jawaharlal replied emphatically that the Congress had agreed only to participate in the Constituent Assembly and regarded itself free to change or modify the Cabinet Mission Plan as it thought best.

The Muslim League had accepted the Cabinet Mission Plan only under duress. Naturally, Mr.Jinnah was not very happy about it. In his speech to the League Council, he had clearly stated that he recommended acceptance only because nothing better could be obtained.......

...Jawaharlal's statement came to him as a bombshell. He immediately issued a statement that this declaration by the Congress President demanded a review of the whole situation. He accordingly asked Liaqat Ali Khan to call a meeting of the League Council and issued a statement to the following effect. The Muslim League Council had accepted the Cabinet Mission Plan in Delhi as it was assured that the Congress also had accepted the scheme and the Plan would be the basis of the future constitution of India. Now that the Congress President had declared that the Congress could change the scheme through its majority in the Constituent Assembly, this would mean that the minorities would be placed at the mercy of the majority.....

The Muslim League Council met at Bombay on 27th July. Mr.Jinnah in his opening speech reiterated the demand for Pakistan as the only course left open to the Muslim League. After three days' discussion, the Council passed a resolution rejecting the Cabinet Mission Plan. It also decided to resort to direct action for the achievement of Pakistan. ....Mr. Jinnah declared 16 August the Direct Action Day, but he did not make it clear what the programme would be.

....16th August was a black day in the history of India. Mob violence unprecedented in the history of India plunged the great city of Calcutta into an orgy of bloodshed, murder and terror....Soon the whole city was in the grip of goondas of both the communities:

.....(At Dum Dum) I found ...a large contingent of the millitary waiting in trucks. When I asked why they were not helping in restoring order, they replied that their orders were to stand ready but not to take any action. Throughout Calcutta, the millitar y and the police were standing by but remained inactive while innocent men and women were being killed. Sixteen august, 1946 was a black day not only for Calcutta but for the whole of India. The turn that events had taken made it almost impossible to expect a peaceful solution by agreement between the Congress and the Muslim League. This was one of the greatest trajedies of Indian history and I have to say with the deepest of regret that a large part of the responsibility for this development rests with Jawaharlal." [Source:India Wins Freedom by Maulana Abul Kalam Azad,(Complete version), Orient Longman, India, 1988, pp 163-170]

Did the Congress try to save the partitioning of the country on communal basis? The answer is no. The way Sylhet and NWFP was pushed to Pakistan highlights this.

Nehru-Patel-Congress spent much time in protesting how grouping would be unfair to Assam and N.W.F.P. Let us hear how Sylhet was partitioned out of Assam:

"The Sylhet referendum was held in July 1947. It was virtually a vote on the twin issues of the reorganisation of India on a communal and of the province of Assam on a linguistic basis. Sylheti Hindus who had for decades agitated for a re-union with Beng al now clung to Assam. On the other hand, Sylheti Muslims who were, on political considerations consistently opposed to the move since 1928, now reversed their position. Some local scheduled caste leaders, too, sided with them. The local Jamiat-ul-Ulema, led by Husain Ahmad Madani, remained consistently opposed to the idea of Pakistan and advised all Muslims of the district to vote for an undivided Assam. Though otherwise influential, they failed to make any impact at all on the Muslim voters. On the Sylheti question, the Assamese public opinion, too, remained understandably cold, but consistent with its earlier stand. ....."the only alternative to the state of things is", wrote Bardoloi to Patel in February 1946,"to separate the Bengali district of Sylhet and a portion of Cachar from Assam and join these with Bengal — a consummation to which the Assamese people are looking forward for the last 70 years". Bardoloi let the Cabinet Mission to understand in April that Assam would be quite prepared t o hand over Sylhet to Eastern Bengal. A year later, under the changed circumstances, it was no longer possible for the APCC to say this so openly. However, the Congress control of the Assam administration was so 'correctly' exercised that it hardly provided any advantage to the local congress during its campaign in Sylhet to win the referendum. It was indeed a lifetime's opportunity for the Assamese leadership 'to get rid of Sylhet' and carve out a linguistically more homogenous province. When the results of the referendum were declared, ther e was a feeling of relief in the Brahmaputra Valley. It was widely suggested there that the Bengali-speaking plains portion of Cachar district, at the least its Hailakandi subdivision, and also the four Bengali speaking thanas of the Dhubri subdivision-th e stronghold of Bhasani, should have been transferred to Pakistan. The Sylhet leaders were discouraged when they tried to salvage a portion of the district through an effective representation to the Boundary Commission". [Source:Planter Raj to Swaraj-Freedom Struggle and Electoral Politics in Assam 1826-1947 by Amalendu Guha, Indian Council of Historical Research, 1977, pp 319-320]

The apologists of Nehru and Congress, also claim that he sabotaged Cabinet Mission because he was worried about the fate of Assam and NWFP in Muslim League dominated Group B and C, I would quote the following about the treatment meted out to NWFP and Kha n Abdul Gaffer Khan, the Frontier Gandhi.

This quote is from the book "Modern India-1885-1947" by Sumit Sarkar, Macmillan India, 1983, page 449. I have earlier showed how Sylhet was put into Pakistan to accomodate Assamese Chauvinism.

"It is difficult to avoid the conclusion that the Congress leadership in 1947 let down very badly indeed the Pathans who had supported the national movement so consistently from the late 1920s. Though the existing N.W.F.P assembly had a Congress majority and had voted in favour of joining the Constituent Assembly, a plebiscite was still forced on the province on the question of choice between joining India or Pakistan. The Congress High Command protested but did not make it a breaking point (as Nehru had successfully done on Plan Balkan) nor did it insist either on a decision by universal franchise, or on inclusion in the choice before voters of the independent Pakthoonistan option. The N.W.F.P Congress eventually decided to boycott the plebiscite in pro test- and N.W.F.P went to Pakistan by a vote of 50.99% of the total, very limited electorate of 572,798 (i.e. by the decision of just 9.52% of the total population of the province). The Frontier Gandhi would later declare with justice that he and his move ment had been 'thrown to the wolves' by the congress leadership."

24 March to June 1946 – Cabinet Mission formulates proposal along with Lord Wavell.

[Page 428] "Wavell was very suspicious of the Cabinet Mission being over friendly with the Congress" [Page 428] "Yet if the Cabinet Mission at times seemed to lean marginally towards the Congress, this was ... what Wavell himself on 29th march described as the 'necessity to avoid the mass movement or revolution which it is in the power of the Congress to start, and which we are not certain that we can control'. It is difficult to avoid the conclusion that the Congress leadership once again spiked its own guns it its eagerness for quick and easy power and desire at all costs to preserve social order."

16 May 1946 – the Cabinet Mission Plan comes out.

[Page 429] "After initial negotiatons had been stalled as usual on the rock of Jinnah's insistence on Pakistan, the Cabinet Mission on 16 May came out with a plan which for a brief moment promised to break the deadlock. This confronted Jin nah with a choice between a moth-eaten Pakistan and a loose, three-tier confederal structure in which Muslims would have the chance of dominating the N.W and N.E. province of a still-united country. ... The alternative suggested was a weak centre controll ing only foreign affairs, defence and communication, with the existing provincial assemblies being grouped into three sections while electing the constituent assembly: Section A for the Hindu-majority provinces, Section B and C for Muslim -majority provin ces of the north-west and north-east."

6 June 1946 – The Muslim League acepts the Cabinet Mission Plan.

24 June 1946 – Congress accepts the plan.

[Page 430] "The League wanted grouping to be compulsory, with Sections B and C developing into solid entities with a view to future secession into Pakistan....The Congress argued that compulsory grouping contradicted the otherwise oft repeate d insistence on provincial autonomy, and was not satisfied with the Mission's clarification (on May 25) that the grouping would be compulsory at first, but provinces would have the right to opt out after the constitution had been finalized and new elections held with it"

10 July 1946 – Nehru declared at a press conference that Congress is not bound by Cabinet Mission Plan.

29-30 July 1946 – League withdraws its acceptance of Cabinet Mission and gives call for Direct Action.

16 August 1946 – Communal violence in Calcutta.

A very interesting revealation is "More Muslims seemed to have died than Hindus, a point made not only by Wavell but also by Patel" [Page 43 2] Sumit Sarkar quotes from Patel's letter to prove this point.

10 March 1947 – "Nehru was telling Wavell in private that 'through the Cabinet Mission Plan was the best solution if it could be carried through-the only real alternative was thepartition of Punjab and Bengal" [Page 436]

[My Comment: Let us shed a silent tear fpr those who were murdered and rendered homeless so that Nehru and Congress and their trading class patrons could extract rent from the rest of India. Let us also not obfuscate the issue by bringing in League here. T he League was representing vested interests who wanted their own patch to suck dry. However, unlike the representation in popular official history, the Congress also sacrificied millions so that they could be in power. That was our 'tryst with destiny'.]

What was the role of our indigeneous capitalists and traders? Here is another caustic quote from Sumit Sarkar's "Modern India":

"Yet war and famine also meant super-profits for some, and as in 1914-18, a major step forward for the Indian bourgeoisie...... The really fantanstic increase was not in production but in profits, particularly speculative gains through profiteering iin fo od, share-market operations and the black market in general. The Indian bourgeoise was a special kind of bourgeoise, characterized by 'ravening greed' and a mania for speculation rather than initiative or efficiency in developing production......The 'Bombay Plan' of January 1944 drawn up by India's leading businessman (including J.R.D.Tata, G.D.Birla, P.Thakurdas, Shri Ram and Kasturbhai Lalbhai) visualized a doubling of per capita national income in fifteen years through quick development of basic indust ries. While little more than a statement of objectives and vague on the questions of distribution and state control, the 'Bombay Plan' was prepared to accept a 'temporary eclipse' in 'freedom of enterprise' in the interests of development, and made a numb er of surprisingly warm references even to the 'Russian experiment'. To quote Kosambi's contemporary analysis again, the bourgeoise 'needs Nehru's leadership', just as in the previous periods of mass struggle it has been intelligent enough to 'to exploit for its own purposes whatever is profitable in the Mahatma's teachings and to reduce all dangerous enunciations to negative philosophical points.' As a class which had never had it so good amidst unprecedented mass misery, the bourgeoise was naturally averse to any further round of popular struggle which could have unmanageably radical consequences and its formidable influence was cast firmly on the side of a negotiated comproomise settlement after 1945. The events of 1945-47, however, tragically proved that in the context of India the price of a negotiated 'transfer of power' was an encouragement of divisive forces culminating in Partiton. A 'blood less' winning of independence would be acompanied by an unimaginably bloody communal carnage" [pp 406-408]

"Your kind letter of 1 June is to hand. I am so glad to see from Viceroy's announcement that things have turned out according to your desire. It is no doubt a very good thing for the Hindus and we will now be free from the communal canker. The partitioned area, of course, would be a Muslim State. Is it not time that we should CONSIDER HINDUSTAN AS A HINDU STATE WITH HINDUISM AS THE STATE RELIGION. We have also to strengthen the country so that it may be able to face any future aggression. I am very happy that the Bengal Partition question has also been settled by you. The question of ministry would loom large in near future. ....Of the many candidates none is strong enough except Syama Prasad [Mookerjee] Babu." [Source:Durga Das edited Sardar Patel's correspondence as quoted in Swadhin Bangabhumi Gothon er Proyas o Parinati by Amalendu Dey, 1975, Ratna Prakashan, Calcutta-emphasis mine]

Popular Myth # 3 The Bengal partition was not opposed

Prominent leaders of Bengal lobbied for an United and Independent Bengal.

"The Leaders of the Bengal Provincial Muslim League did not bargain for the suppression of autonomous and soverign rights of Bengal in the Pakistani set up to come. This suppression, therefore, might have prepared the ground later on inMarch 1947 to goad H.S Suhrawordy, Abul Hashem, Fazlur Rahman (Dacca), Mohammed ali (Bogra) and other luminaries of the Bengal Provincial Muslim League to join Sarat Chandra Bose's campaign for United soverign Bengal." [Source: Banga-Bhanga O Samprodayik Rajniti by Badruddin Umar, 1st Edition, 1987, Chirayat Prakashan, Calcutta. Translated from Bengali by me, from Sarat Chandra Bose — Commemoration Volume as quoted in Badruddin Umar]

Let me quote from a letter which Sarat Bose wrote to Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel. This letter was written on 27th May 1947:

"Today the position is that communal frenzy is not the monopoly of the Muslim Leagues; it has also overtaken large sections of Hindus both Congressites and Mahasabhaites. The Congress stand regarding partition has been taken advantage of by the sections m entioned above to inflame communal passions further. It has also brought back the Hindu Mahasabha to life and considerably strengthened its position. I have given the public from time to time a very clear indication of my views. I consider it most unfortunate that the Congress Working Committee conceded Pakistan and supported partition. It is true that I have not been able to address public meetings ye t for reasons of health; but having been in close touch with public opinion both in West and East Bengal, I can say that IT IS NOT A FACT THAT BENGALI HINDUS UNANIMOUSLY DEMAND PARTITION. As far as East Bengal is concerned, there is not the slightest doub t that the overwhelming majority of Hindus there are opposed to partition. As regards West Bengal, the agitation for partition has gained ground because the Congress came to the aid of the Hindu Mahasabha and also because communal passions have roused amo ng Hindus on account of the happenings since August last. The demand for partition is more or less confined to the middle classes. .....Future generations will, I am afraid condemn us for conceding division of India and supporting partition of Bengal and the Punjab." [Source:Durga Das edited Sardar Patel's correspondence as quoted in Swadhin Bangabhumi Gothon er Proyas o Parinati by Amalendu Dey, 1975, Ratna Prakashan, Calcutta-emphasis mine]

Krishak Praja Party of Fazlul Haque and Communist Party were against partition of Bengal. Some of the Muslim League leaders like Abul Hashem, Fazlur Rahman and Suhrawardy were against Bengal partition. This group were supportive of the independent Bengal plan. Muslim League leaders like Akram Khan were in favour of including Bengal in Pakistan.

Also let me quote from a letter which Sarat Bose wrote to Gandhi on June 14 1947.

"...My faith remains unshaken and I propose to work in my own humble way for the unity of Bengal. Even after the raging and tearing campaign that has been carried on in favour of the partition, I have not the slightest doubt that if a referendum were take n, the Hindus of Bengal by a large majority would vote against partition. The voice of Bengal has been stifled for the moment but I have every hope that it will assert itself." [source: ibid, pp 92-93]

I hope that Sarat Bose's sentiment will come true and the forces of progress and peace will triumph over forces of division.